THE THOUGHT OF SAINT THOMAS IN "HUMANAE VITAE"
It is not a mystery that the Encyclical Humanae Vitae—the
tenth anniversary of which falls this year (25 July) has been the most
debated document in the ordinary Magisterium of the Sovereign Pontiff
Paul VI. It had been desired by him with firm resolution and far-sighted
deliberation, for the purpose of "a new and deeper reflection upon
the principles of the moral teaching on marriage: a teaching founded on
the natural law, illuminated and enriched by divine Revelation" (n.
4). It was legitimate, therefore, to expect a brightening of the
rather stormy sky of Catholic thought on the legitimacy or not of
artificial contraceptive methods.
On the contrary, the Encyclical led to lively reactions and dissent,
at least in a number of students of moral, ecclesiastical and lay
disciplines. This has certainly not fostered the "unity in the same
mind and the same judgment" (1 Cor 1:10), wished by the Supreme
Pastor (Enc. H.V. 28).
But the Pope was well aware that this universal concord, even if
intended and ardently invoked by the Spirit of truth and love, would not
be easy to attain; actually, he foresaw its failure, at least as regards
its universality. In fact, he observed: "It can be foreseen that
this teaching will perhaps not be easily received by all: too numerous
are those voices... which are contrary to the voice of the Church. To
tell the truth, the Church is not surprised to be made, like her divine
Founder, a ‘sign of contradiction’ (Lk 2:34); yet she does not
because of this cease to proclaim with humble firmness the entire moral
law, both natural and evangelical" (n. 18).
Looking back at the decade since the publication of the Encyclical,
an obvious question arises: What were the reasons that, like a stumbling
block, caused the partial failure of a document of supreme importance,
not only on the pastoral plane, but also, and primarily, on the
doctrinal one? There were many. Leaving it to others, more expert, to
consider them in a more adequate and thorough way, I will merely call
attention to the dissent that has taken place around the quotation of St
Thomas's thought. Speaking of "responsible parenthood",
the Pope states: "In relation to the biological processes,
responsible parenthood means the knowledge and respect of their
functions; human intellect discovers in the power of giving life
biological laws which are part of the human person" (n. 10). In
note 9, attached to this declaration, readers are referred to St Thomas:
Summa Theologiae, I-II, q. 94, a. 2.
The question has been posed: "Does the doctrine of Thomas
Aquinas, to which Paul VI refers as the rational basis of his teaching,
justify knowledge and respect of the functions of the biological
processes. Or does it not rather encourage knowledge and manipulation
of these functions, for the good of the human person, according to a
wide interpretation of the principle of totality?" Has it not a
view also towards avoiding greater harm or promoting the greater good of
married couples, the family, and society, also on the international
plane, such as is the planning of births on the world scale? (cf. Franz
Böckle, Osservazioni teologiche sull'Enc. "Humanae
Vitae", in the vol. Humanae Vitae, theologico-pastoral
notes, AA.VV., Queriniana, 4th ed. 1969, pp. 124-125).
It is clear that, if the interpretation given by the Encyclical to
the text of St Thomas betrays his thought, the teachmg of the
Magisterium still keeps its real value as regards the true
interpretation of natural law with regard to contraceptives; but it
loses the support of the Common Doctor of the Church; and, at least in
this case, he would lose the right to this title. The well-known saying
should rather be applied to him: "Aliquando etiam bonus dormitat
Homerus".
But, in respect of the truth, it seems that it must be recognized
that, with regard to the morality of the conjugal act, the Doctor
Angelicus did not nod, nor did the Encyclical Humanae Vitae abuse
its doctrinal authority when it condemned also in his name the
manipulation of the functions of biological processes, that is, the
positive alternation of the latter, for deliberate contraceptive
purposes.
We read, in fact, in the text of Summa Theologiae, quoted by
the Pope: "The first principle of practical reason is based on the
notion of good, good being what all beings desire. Here,
therefore, is the first precept of the law: Good is to be done and to
be sought, evil is to be avoided. And all the other precepts of
natural law are based on it; so that all other things to be done or to
be avoided belong to the law of nature, since practical reason knows
them naturally as human goods. But all things towards
which man has a natural inclination, are accepted by reason as good, and
therefore as to be done, and their opposites are accepted as bad and as
to be avoided; because good presents itself as a purpose to be reached,
evil as the opposite. So the order of the precepts of natural law
follows the order of natural inclinations. In fact we find in man, first
of all, the inclination to that natural good which he has in common with
all substances: that is, since every substance aims by its very nature
at preserving its own being...
"Second, we find in man the disposition towards more specific,
things, owing to the nature he has in common with the other animals. And
on this side there belong to natural law 'the things that human nature
has taught all animals' (Ulpian, De Iustitia et Iure, lib.
1), for example, the union of male and female looking after offspring,
and other similar things. Third, we find in man an inclination towards
the good which is in conformity with the nature of reason, and which is
specifically human: the inclination, for example, to know the truth
about God, and to live in society" (Vers ital., ed. Salani,
Vol. XII, pp. 94, 96).
Ontological personality
That the biological processes and their functions are part not only
of man's specific nature, but also of his ontological personality,
appears clearly from the following Thomistic definition of the human person:
"The supposit is everything that the specific nature possesses as
its formal and perfective part... Everything that is found in a person,
whether it constitutes his nature or not, is united with him in unity of
person... The operations, natural properties and all things that belong
to nature in the concrete, are attributed only to hypostasis: we say in
fact that this man reasons, laughs, is a rational animal" (Summa
Theologiae, III, q. 2, aa. 2-3, ed. cit., vol. XXIII, pp, 72, 78).
It is, therefore, incompatible with the genuine thought of St Thomas
to appeal to the dignity, the autonomy, the freedom, the dominion
of man over his body, and to the real interests of the human person, to
justify morally the manipulation of his biological nature; as
though the latter does not share the essential dignity of nature and of
the human person and is not also ordained to the good of the human
composite and of the complete man, as a rational being, a member of the
family and of society. This human truth is clearly seen also from
another text of the Summa found in the treatise on the Holy
Trinity. There St Thomas writes: "The person generally means an
individual substance of rational nature... Therefore the person, in any
nature, means what is distinct in that nature. Thus in human nature it
means this flesh, these [bones], this soul, which are the principle of
individuation for man; these things, though not being part of the
meaning of person, are, however, part of the meaning of human person"
(I, q. 29, a. 4; vers cit., vol. III, page 90).
But if we want a text of the Holy Doctor which lets us, know
explicitly his thought on the serious evil of contraception, then we
must have recourse to a work of his intended to enlighten also "all
men of goodwill" (as is the Encyclical Humanae Vitae of Paul
VI, by divine law Pastor of all redeemed humanity, because all men are
called to form the one Mystical Body of Christ: the Catholic Church).
This is what St Thomas writes in The Summa against the Gentiles (do
not be scandalized by the title): "God has care for every thing in
relation to its good. Now, for every being good consists in attaining
its own purpose; and evil lies in moving away from the due purpose. And
this holds good both for the whole and for its parts so that each part
of man and every act of his must reach the due purpose. Well, human
sperm, although it is superfluous as regards the preservation of the
individual, is necessary, however, for the preservation of the
species... Therefore the ejaculation of sperm must be so ordained that
there may follow from it both the begetting and the upbringing of
offspring. It is clear from this that all ejaculation of sperm, produced
in such a way that begetting cannot follow from it, is contrary to man's
good. And if this is done deliberately, it is necessarily a sin. I am
speaking, however, of those ways according to which, of themselves,
("secundum se") procreation cannot follow: for example, all
ejaculation of sperm without the natural copulation of male and female.
If, on the other hand, procreation cannot follow from the ejaculation of
the sperm because of some accident, it would not for this reason be
contrary to nature and a sin: as when, for example, the woman is
barren... It must not be thought that it is a trivial sin to produce
ejaculation of sperm outside the due purpose of begetting and bringing
up offspring, owing to the fact that it is a trivial sin or not at all a
sin to use some other part of the body for purposes to which it is not
ordained by nature... Because with these disordered uses man's good is
not prevented in a considerable way. On the contrary the ejaculation of
sperm contrary to ordained purpose removes that natural good which is
the preservation of the species. Therefore after the sin
of murder with which human nature already existing is destroyed, there
comes in the second place this kind of sin, with which the begetting of human
nature is prevented"' (From It. version by Tito S. Centi,
Unione Tipografico-Editrice Torinese, 1975, pp. 628-864).
Clear principles
It would be arbitrary and unjust, however to attribute either to St
Thomas or to the Encyclical H.V. (as some people have done) the
rigoristic idea according to which every conjugal act must
have procreation as its purpose ("finis operis" and
"finis operantis"). In fact, both St Thomas and the
Magisterium of the Church are well aware that many conjugal acts cannot
("per accidens") have this purpose (e.g. in infertile periods,
in barren individuals, after the menopause, in pregnancy), but both St
Thomas and the Encyclical teach that no act, in itself potentially
fertile, may be deprived of its fruitful capacity by a positive, free
and intentional intervention. In this case, in fact, there
would be a manipulation of human physiological nature, which is not
justifiable for any anthropological, family or social purpose, even if
the procreation and education of offspring are not the only legitimate
ends of marriage.
It is opportune, finally, to point out that for St Thomas the evil
of contraception does not belong to the "First common
principles" ("prima principia communia") which express
man's fundamental inclinations, both as substance, and as an animal or
living being, and as a rational being. It belongs, on the contrary, to
the "direct conclusions" by way of, or after the manner of,
necessary deductions, be they near or remote. For example, the
commandment which forbids killing is derived from the general principle
that "one must not harm anyone". Such are the Ten
Commandments.
I dare not tackle here the interesting and vast subject of natural
law according to St Thomas. Just in the last few days a masterly work,
fruit of many years of teaching, has come out on this matter, from the
Dominican Father Reginaldo Pizzorni: Il diritto naturale dalle
origini a S. Tomaso d'Aquino. Historico-critical essay (Pontificia
Università Lateranense-Città Nuova Editrice, 1978, pp. 522). The
author, a lecturer in philosophy of law at the Lateran, St Thomas and
Urban Pontifical Universities, reproduces and examines, in the first
part, the main texts of various authors, including St Thomas. In the
second part, he examines systematically the naturalness, historicity and
dynamism of natural law in the classical Thomistic definition of
"participation of eternal law in the rational creature".
I do not presume that I have offered readers an adequate defence of
the Encyclical Humanae Vitae even as regards the quotation of St
Thomas. I think, however, that it is possible and necessary, taking into
account also the valuable critical study of Fr Pizzorni who aligns
himself with the best interpreters, ancient and modern. In conclusion, I
point out that it is comforting to find oneself in agreement in defence
of Paul VI's Encyclical, against the accusations of ultraconservatorism,
physicism and biologism, also with scientists such as
Prof. P.P. Grasset of the Academy of Sciences, France. The latter wrote
in Le Figaro of 8 October 1968: "The Pope has spoken as
defender of the individual and of the whole of mankind. The Encyclical H.Y.
ensures in an elevated way the maintenance of Christian doctrine and
morality and also the development of true scientific humanism. The
Encyclical is in harmony with the data of biology, it reminds doctors of
their duties, and starts man along a way in which his dignity, both
physical and moral, will not undergo any aggression. For us, the
controversy is closed" (quoted by P.E. Lio, O.F.M., in the volume
in collaboration: Medicina e Morale, Tip. Poligl. Vatic.,
1968, p. 153).
|
